The India-Australia security and defence relationship: developments, constraints and prospects by Brewster, David
 Security Challenges, Vol. 10, No. 1 (2014), pp. 65-86. - 65 - 
The India-Australia Security  
and Defence Relationship: 
Developments,  
Constraints and Prospects 
David Brewster 
In coming years, India is likely to become one of Australia‟s most important partners in the 
region.  This article explores how the security and defence relationship has developed in recent 
times.  It discusses challenges in the relationship before exploring potential areas for enhanced 
security and defence cooperation.  It argues that if Australia wishes to be successful in its 
objectives of promoting greater cooperation with India, it will need to move in a consistent and 
sustained manner with a time horizon considerably longer than it is generally used to.  In some 
cases, Australia may also need to move past any immediate expectations of the reciprocity that 
would be expected in developing security partnerships with most countries. 
In coming years, India is likely to become one of Australia‟s most important 
partners in the region.  The rise of India will make it one of Australia‟s most 
important economic relationships and a key diplomatic collaborator.  There 
are also growing expectations that India will take greater responsibility for 
regional security.  
While they share many institutions and values, India and Australia have long 
operated in largely separate strategic spheres.  But these spheres are 
converging.  The two countries now share many security concerns, including 
the growing impact of China on the strategic environment.  Australia has 
recognised India as an important new strategic partner.  India too is 
beginning to see Australia as one of several new security partners in the 
Indo-Pacific.   
Part 1 of this article provides an overview of recent developments in the 
relationship and the challenges faced in developing a security and defence 
partnership.  Part 2 then explores in detail the many potential areas for 
enhanced cooperation between them, while Part 3 includes observations on 
prospects for the relationship.
1
  The article concludes that if Australia wishes 
to enhance its security and defence relationship with India, it must be 
prepared to act outside its comfort zone.  In many ways, India represents a 
sui generis case in Australia‟s regional relationships, certainly in the degree 
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of caution it exhibits in relation to security and defence cooperation with 
other countries.  This represents a considerable challenge for Australia in 
developing an effective model for engagement with India.  Policy-makers 
must accept that Australia will need to move in a consistent and sustained 
manner with India, with a time horizon considerably longer than it is 
generally used to.   
1.  Developments in the  
Strategic Relationship—and Challenges 
For most of their history as independent states the political and strategic 
relationship between India and Australia has not been close: bilateral 
relations have often been characterised by long periods of indifference 
interspersed with occasional political irritations.  During the Cold War and for 
some time after, India was preoccupied with its immediate security problems 
in South Asia, while Australia traditionally focused on security concerns in 
East Asia and the Pacific.  Australia rarely figured in New Delhi‟s security 
calculations except as a US stooge.  Canberra considered India as difficult to 
deal with, anti-American, and too close to the Soviets.
2
   
But Australia and India‟s spheres of strategic interest are now converging 
and their strategic interests are coming into much greater alignment.  The 
emergence of both China and India as major powers with strategic interests 
across the Indo-Pacific is bringing India and Australia closer together and 
forcing them to engage on security and defence issues much more than ever 
before.  Two factors, in particular, have been important in overcoming 
previous constraints on the relationship.  The first is India‟s limited strategic 
rapprochement with the United States over the last decade or so.  The 
distance of the India-US relationship had previously caused both India and 
Australia to look at each other with faint suspicion.  This roadblock is now 
much diminished.  The second is shared concerns about the rise of China, 
although as will be discussed later, India and Australia hold mildly different 
perspectives on the issue.  But, importantly, certainly from Canberra‟s 
perspective, the US and China factors should not be seen as overshadowing 
the many other reasons for the closer bilateral engagement between 
Australia and India. 
Over the last decade or so, Australia has pursued the relationship with 
considerable enthusiasm.  This has led to a series of bilateral agreements 
that provide a formal basis for cooperation on security and defence-related 
matters.  This included a Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation in 2009.  
This established a framework for further cooperation in security matters and 
provides for the formalisation of regular consultations and dialogues between 
foreign ministers, military and diplomatic representatives, and joint working 
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groups on maritime security operations and counter-terrorism and 
immigration.
3
  India has made analogous declarations only with the United 
States and Japan.  
Over the last decade or so, regular bilateral dialogues have significantly 
expanded opportunities for engagement on security and defence.  These 
include annual meetings of Australian and Indian Foreign Ministers, regular 
meetings of Defence Ministers, annual Defence Policy Talks at senior official 
level, regular visits of Service Chiefs and regular staff talks between senior 
officers of the three services.  But these dialogues, as important as they are, 
have so far yielded few concrete results.  Many observers do not consider 
that they yet have a great deal of substance and engagement at an 
operational or tactical level remains extremely thin.  Indeed, despite much 
rhetoric, the road towards a closer security partnership is likely to be a slow 
and frustrating one for its proponents.  
To a considerable extent this reflects differences in historical experience and 
cultures of India and Australia.  While these differences have been narrowing 
in recent years, they continue to have significant effect on the dynamics of 
the relationship and will likely continue to do so for many years to come. 
Some of these challenges include differences in strategic traditions; 
differences in decision-making processes; and perspectives on China and 
Pakistan. 
DIFFERENCES IN STRATEGIC TRADITIONS  
Through their history as independent states, India and Australia have 
developed different strategic traditions and attitudes towards security 
cooperation, and this remains a significant issue in their engagement today.  
In short, Australia sees security alignments and cooperation as an important 
means of enhancing its influence while many in New Delhi effective see 
cooperation as reducing India‟s influence and inconsistent with a national 
objective of achieving „strategic autonomy‟.  This objective is often seen as 
being closely linked with India‟s aspirations to become a great power.  
Though rarely defined, it has a strong resonance in Indian strategic thinking, 
just as the idea of „non-alignment‟ was an ideological touchstone during the 
Cold War.  This differs significantly from Australia‟s strategic view of the 
world.  Indeed, strategic autonomy should be seen as part of India‟s „national 
DNA‟, just as strategic collaboration is part of Australia‟s.   
The idea of strategic autonomy leads many among the Indian elite to have 
strong instincts against security cooperation with other states, except under 
the clear banner of the United Nations.  For many, security cooperation, 
particularly on operational matters, carries the taint that India‟s strategic 
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autonomy will be undermined.
4
  These concerns are intensified in relation to 
the United States, which many in Delhi still see as having hidden motives 
with respect to India.  For this reason, Australia has been relatively careful in 
keeping its defence and security engagement with India on a bilateral basis 
and not simply trying to piggy-back on the United States.   
These suspicions about security cooperation per se tend to be more muted 
in the Indian Navy.  In comparison to the other services and many defence 
bureaucrats, the Indian Navy has a more international outlook that reflects 
the global perspectives it inherited from the Royal Navy and the fact that it 
often operates far from India‟s shores, frequently in (informal) cooperation 
with other navies.  Over the last two decades, the Indian Navy has been at 
the forefront of pushing for cooperation with other regional navies and it 
takes what initiatives it can within the strictures imposed by the Indian 
Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA).   
Some in New Delhi also question whether there is any real need for India to 
cooperate with others, believing that India, as a rising power, should be able 
to „go it alone‟ in expanding its regional security role as part of an overall 
objective of achieving strategic autonomy.  Why should India tie itself down 
in engagements with other powers?  As one mid-ranking Indian naval officer 
commented, “Why would a growing power like India want to cooperate with a 
declining power like Australia?”  This is compounded by the view of some in 
New Delhi (one that is admittedly waning) that Australia is not an 
„independent‟ strategic actor due to its relationship with the United States.  
More sophisticated Indian interlocutors with Australia have a good 
understanding of the complexities of Australia‟s strategic perspectives 
beyond the US alliance, but the US alliance still remains a material factor in 
Indian thinking about Australia.   
DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVES ON THE ROLE OF DEFENCE RELATIONSHIPS  
Another major challenge in developing the relationship is the very different 
perspectives on the role and importance of defence relationships as part of 
foreign policy.  Australia sees its defence forces as playing an important 
foreign policy role.  As the 2013 Defence White Paper states: “Australia‟s 
international defence engagement is a critical component of the 
Government‟s approach to managing the strategic transformation occurring 
in our region.”
5
  For decades Australia has made significant investments in 
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the development of defence forces of regional partners through defence 
training and cooperation.
6
 
In contrast, India has a narrower view of the role of its armed forces, 
including the role of defence force relations with other countries.  New Delhi 
does not see the Indian armed forces as being a principal foreign policy 
actor.  The Indian bureaucracy keeps a tight reign over the defence forces, 
seeing them as fulfilling only a narrow military role, and although many 
senior Indian military officers see the benefit of greater contact with their 
foreign counterparts, they face considerable bureaucratic and political 
constraints.
7
  The Indian Defence Minister A. K. Antony has also limited the 
amount of contact between the Indian and foreign officers, especially with 
the United States and its allies, apparently from concerns that Indian officers 
may become tainted by Western perspectives.
8
  The Indian Navy has been 
permitted (or has carved out for itself) a relatively greater measure of 
freedom in dealing with foreign counterparts—usually on the basis that such 
interactions take place well out of sight of New Delhi.   
But this is not just a bureaucratic issue.  Keeping its defence relationships 
within tight parameters is consistent with India‟s policy of „poly-alignment‟ 
with many different counterparts.  For example, although it has a close 
security relationship with Israel in defence technology and intelligence, India 
keeps the relationship within certain bounds to allow it to continue to have 
friendly relations with Iran and other countries in West Asia. 
These differences in perspectives of the role of defence forces in foreign 
relations are reflected in the differences in resources committed to foreign 
liaison.  Despite India‟s huge military establishment, the Defence Protocol 
and Foreign Liaison Division, the defence diplomacy group within the Indian 
MoD, is staffed with merely half a dozen officers.  In contrast, Australia‟s 
main defence diplomacy group, the International Policy Division of the 
Australian Department of Defence (DoD), has a staff of around fifty, which is 
in addition to the foreign liaison groups operated by the individual armed 
services.  As a result, the Indian MoD is often overwhelmed by requests from 
many states wishing to interact with India, many of whom are of more 
immediate importance to New Delhi than Australia.   
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DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES  
One of the biggest causes of frustration for those tasked with developing the 
relationship is the differences in political and bureaucratic decision-making 
processes and style.  
As noted above, the Australian armed forces have quite a deal of latitude in 
engaging with foreign counterparts as a way of encouraging cooperation and 
extending Australia‟s influence.  In contrast, the Indian armed forces operate 
under the tight control of the civilian bureaucracy in the MoD.  On top of this 
is the additional requirement that the Indian MoD itself must also obtain 
clearance from the Indian MEA for its foreign liaison activities (for example, 
in arranging foreign visits by senior officers), which places yet another level 
of bureaucratic constraints on India‟s activities.   
Australian interlocutors report considerable frustrations in dealing with the 
Indian bureaucracy which often springs from differences in the way they 
work.  The implementation of initiatives believed to have been previously 
agreed are frequently blocked or delayed by the Indian bureaucracy for no 
discernible reason.  These reports are by no means specific to Australia and 
are consistent with the experiences of many foreigners in dealing with New 
Delhi.  Indian bureaucracy also has a strong tendency towards inertia, being 
sprinkled with power centres that have power to veto initiatives but little 
incentive to approve them.  Indian bureaucratic decision-making in general 
also tends to be ad hoc, with only broad guidelines set by the political 
leadership, giving bureaucrats considerable scope to implement (or not) 
decisions.  This gives bureaucrat decision-makers considerable power to 
prevent the implementation of initiatives even when they have received in-
principle approval at the political level.  However, it is equally true that the 
latitude allowed to Indian bureaucrats means that they can sometimes move 
fast to implement measures they approve of.  Interlocutors require the skill 
(or luck) to encounter the latter and not the former. 
Australian policy-makers and officials have decades of experience of dealing 
with their counterparts in East Asia and have become more culturally 
acclimatised to developing security relationships in that region.  But they 
clearly are still learning how to work around the Indian bureaucratic 
system—including how to make contact with the bureaucracy at the right 
level.  As one senior Indian naval officer commented, one must engage at a 
level where a bureaucrat will have time and interest in the relevant matter.  It 
is not a question of trying to go as high as possible in the hierarchy, because 
if you try to engage at too high a level “you will get jammed”. 
On top of these bureaucratic differences, there is a basic difference in how 
foreign policy is formed.  In general, the Indian foreign policy decision-
making process is highly reactive, and Delhi often only takes action in the 
face of a crisis—and there is simply no immediate security crisis that 
requires cooperation between India and Australia.   
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PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA   
Mutual concerns about China are also an important factor in the relationship, 
although differences in perceptions can sometimes cause problems.  China 
is a major factor in India‟s strategic calculations, including numerous claims 
about China‟s so-called „String of Pearls‟ strategy to develop a naval 
presence in the Indian Ocean.  Decision-makers in New Delhi may not 
wholly believe these claims, but they do reflect a visceral concern that China 
wants to restrict India‟s freedom of action in the Indian Ocean.  In contrast, 
Australian analysts tend to be more understanding of China‟s interests in 
protecting its trading routes in the Indian Ocean and treat claims about 
Strings of Pearls with a degree of scepticism.
9
  
Despite these differences, there can be little doubt that China plays an 
important role in the India-Australia relationship.  Among other things, both 
India and Australia want to be in a position to signal to China that they have 
options in terms of forming regional security partnerships if China becomes 
overly assertive in the Indian Ocean or Southeast Asia.  As one former 
Indian diplomat put it: “What can India and Australia do together that will 
send the right signals to China?” 
PERSPECTIVES ON PAKISTAN 
There are also differences in perspectives towards Pakistan, although these 
are currently being managed reasonably well.  In the years after the Cold 
War, there was talk of other states „de-hyphenating‟ or „de-linking‟ their 
relationships with India and Pakistan.  In fact, over the last decade, Canberra 
has largely de-linked India and Pakistan in its strategic thinking.  Canberra 
now clearly recognises that India is an important economic and security 
partner, and a net security provider to the region, while Pakistan is 
considered by many in Canberra as a significant threat to regional stability 
and a potential failed state.   
Nevertheless, despite the „de-hyphenation‟ Australia‟s relationship with 
Pakistan could still be somewhat of a drag on the relationship with India.  
Australia has a security relationship with Pakistan dating back to the Cold 
War.  Australia‟s military presence in Afghanistan and its focus on 
counterterrorism in recent years has caused the engagement to grow further, 
and Australia now provides considerable assistance in training of the 
Pakistan army.  However, Canberra may come to the view that the 
drawdown of Australia‟s military commitment in Afghanistan provides an 
opportunity to downgrade its defence engagement with Pakistan.  
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2.  Opportunities for Security and Defence Cooperation 
Although there are considerable challenges in developing the relationship 
these are more than offset by the possible opportunities.  This section 
examines potential areas for enhanced cooperation between India and 
Australia, such as: 
 security dialogues; 
 cooperation in Indian Ocean regional institutions; 
 cooperation in other international groupings; 
 people-to-people contacts; 
 naval exercises and training; 
 humanitarian and disaster relief/search and rescue; 
 maritime piracy; 
 maritime border protection and maritime domain awareness; 
 cooperation between other military services; 
 defence technology cooperation; and 
 Antarctic research. 
While there are many potential opportunities, Australia needs to act 
strategically in proposing areas of cooperation that fit well with India‟s 
strategic perspectives and traditions and do not push political hot buttons.  
Australia should not simply try to replicate defence engagement programs 
that it has used with other neighbours. 
SECURITY DIALOGUES 
As previously discussed, over the last few years Australia and India have 
established a number of regular bilateral security dialogues or engagements.  
Even if these are frequently more form than substance, they represent a big 
step forward compared with the previous level of engagement.  Canberra‟s 
current approach is to regularise these engagements and avoid pushing too 
hard to give them substance.  It is assumed that they will gain more 
substance over time as a relationship of trust is developed, although some 
observers still have their doubts about this. 
One priority for Australia should be to expand these dialogues to include 
other partners.  An important missed opportunity in this respect was the so-
called Quadrilateral Security Dialogue among Japan, the United States, India 
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and Australia which was proposed by Japan in 2007.  However, although 
Australia participated in some initial consultations, it later publicly backed 
away from the proposal, causing considerable damage to Australia‟s 
credibility in New Delhi.  Although India too backed away from the 
Quadrilateral, it was the manner in which Australia acted that caused lasting 
damage to its reputation.  India now participates in a Trilateral Security 
Dialogue with the United States and Japan at the sub-secretary level.  The 
establishment of an analogous dialogue involving India, Australia, and the 
United States would represent a significant step forward in the relationship.  
Although New Delhi has resisted Australian proposals to establish such a 
dialogue, this view may change after the forthcoming Indian general 
elections. 
Both Australia and India also see considerable benefit in working together to 
draw Indonesia into greater diplomatic and security cooperation in the 
region.  India, Australia, and Indonesia are the past, current, and incoming 
chairs of the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA),
10
 while Australia and 
Indonesia are respectively the current and incoming chairs of Indian Ocean 
Naval Symposium (IONS).  This creates practical opportunities for more 
dialogue among this „troika‟.  In September 2013, the first track 2 Trilateral 
Indian Ocean Dialogue among India-Australia-Indonesia was held in New 
Delhi and there are plans for further such dialogues in 2014.  Regular 
dialogues would represent an important acknowledgement by the three 
countries of their common interests in regional security.  
COOPERATION WITHIN INDIAN OCEAN REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
Unlike East Asia, where an alphabet soup of institutions provides numerous 
forums for dialogue and cooperation, the Indian Ocean region is thin on pan-
regional groupings.  This reflects the great diversity of states within the 
region and, indeed, the lack of any real understanding that the Indian Ocean 
constitutes a region at all.   
The two pan-Indian Ocean groupings of any significance are IORA and 
IONS, the latter of which is a forum for interaction between regional navies 
based on the model of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium.  While these 
groupings are likely to provide only limited scope for region-wide 
cooperation, they are both becoming useful loci of bilateral cooperation 
between India and Australia. 
IORA was established in 1997 with the principal aim of promoting regional 
trade, but has had few concrete achievements since that time.  Over the last 
few years, Australia and India have both attempted to revive interest in the 
grouping.  Australia assumed the chair from India in November 2013.  In 
2011, India and Australia worked together to bring maritime security-related 
issues onto IORA‟s agenda for the first time.  Despite these developments, it 
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is unlikely that IORA will become a significant actor in regional security any 
time soon.  Its role is likely to be limited to a useful talk-shop for littoral states 
on „soft‟ maritime security issues, although that in itself is a major step 
forward from the current position.  IORA could however potentially act as an 
umbrella grouping to encourage the implementation of security initiatives 
among members on a sub-regional basis (for example, among India, 
Australia, and Indonesia in the eastern Indian Ocean).  
IONS is the only pan-Indian Ocean grouping of states that has a significant 
security element.  The grouping, which was established in 2008 under the 
sponsorship of the Indian Navy, involves a biennial meeting of navy chiefs 
with the objective of encouraging an exchange of perspectives on a relatively 
informal basis.  IONS includes the navies of all the littoral states of the Indian 
Ocean.  Although the majority of navies in the Indian Ocean have severely 
limited capabilities and function as little more than coastguards, IONS still 
represents a potentially important forum for the exchange of perspectives on 
maritime security.  It also represents a potential platform through which 
countries like India and Australia can take small steps towards common 
perspectives on security issues and even on operationalising cooperation on 
such matters as maritime domain awareness.  As the chair of IONS Australia 
now has an opportunity to breathe more life into the grouping, particularly in 
encouraging greater cooperation between Australia, India, and ASEAN 
states.  
COOPERATION IN OTHER INTERNATIONAL SECURITY GROUPINGS 
There may also be scope for India-Australia cooperation on security issues 
at a global level, including within various non-proliferation regimes.  These 
include the Australia Group (a grouping of some forty-one states and 
international organisations that collaborate to prevent the abuse of dual-use 
technology and materials for chemical and biological weapons programmes), 
the Nuclear Supplier Group (suppliers of nuclear materials and technology), 
the Missile Technology Control Regime (relating to the proliferation of missile 
technologies) and the Wassenaar Arrangement (aimed at non-proliferation of 
conventional arms and dual use goods).  Australia is chair of the Australia 
Group and an active member of the other regimes.  India is currently not a 
member of any of these groupings, which represents a significant anomaly in 
the international arms control system.  
In 2010, President Barack Obama signalled US support for bringing India 
into the various export control regimes.  Rory Medcalf of the Lowy Institute 
argues that Australia‟s role in the Australia Group can give it some leverage 
to assist India.  The Australia Group may be a logical place to begin India‟s 
formal entry into the global export control network, because it is not 
connected to any residual sensitivities about nuclear issues.  Given India‟s 
massive chemical industry and the growing biotechnology sector, the 
absence of India from the export control regime is unsustainable.  Australian 
assistance in the Australia Group could also help to overcome any remaining 
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misperceptions in New Delhi that Australia does not trust India on non-
proliferation.
11
  But, as one report noted, building a consensus in favour of 
Indian membership in any of these regimes will take time.   
The participation by India in such groups may also require changes in New 
Delhi‟s attitudes towards such regimes.  India has long opposed the 
international nuclear non-proliferation system, which it argued unfairly 
discriminated against it.  India also opposed other export control regimes 
based on the argument that they were part of a western policy of denying 
technology to India and other developing countries.  India‟s current position, 
that it should be granted entry into all international export control regimes 
simultaneously, is likely to significantly delay any progress in this area, 
particularly in light of the large and varied membership of each of the 
groupings. 
PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE CONSULTATIONS AND EXCHANGES 
People-to-people networks will be an extremely important factor in 
developing the India-Australia security and defence relationship.  The 
development of personal relationships and experiences of policy-makers, 
military officers, and civilians in the security community can provide sorely-
needed glue in the bilateral relationship.  It is in Australia‟s interests to 
encourage a better understanding of different strategic perspectives and 
political and bureaucratic processes, which are important drivers in what 
India does (or more frequently does not do) in its security relations.   
Both the Indian and Australian armed forces (and in particular the navies) 
would, as a matter of principle, likely welcome initiatives that give greater 
access to training opportunities with their counterparts.  However, creating 
such opportunities will require overcoming bureaucratic inertia, especially on 
the Indian side.  As discussed, India allocates considerably less resources to 
defence cooperation than Australia, and it is overwhelmed by suitors that 
wish to engage with it.   
There are currently regular exchanges of mid-level and senior officers 
between Indian and Australian military colleges.  India offers one position 
each year for a mid-level Australian officer at its Defence Services Staff 
College, and most years it also offers one position for a senior Australian 
officer at the National Defence College (which is relatively significant given 
that only four positions are offered annually to western countries).   
Currently, two positions are offered annually to Indian officers at the 
Australian Defence College (ADC): one at the Australian Command and 
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Staff College (out of forty-five positions for foreign officers) and one at the 
Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies (out of twenty-three positions 
offered to foreigners).  However, there are no Indian officer cadets attending 
the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA) (out of approximately forty 
foreign cadets).  There are also no Indian instructors at the ADC or ADFA 
(out of around ten foreign instructors currently at those institutions).  There is 
clearly significant room to expand the Indian presence at Australian military 
training institutions, but probably less scope in practice for the placement of 
more Australian officers at Indian institutions.  Person-to-person contacts 
can also be encouraged through exchanges of technical instructors or the 
provision of small training teams.  
Importantly, the building of personal relationships must occur on both the 
military and civilian sides in the security community.  This can include 
exchanges of civilian analysts and commentators between quality civilian 
think tanks and academic institutions focusing on security-related issues.  
The objective would be to promote public discussion and analysis of the 
relationship as part of the policy-making process. 
NAVAL EXERCISES AND TRAINING 
The principal point of contact between the Indian and Australian armed 
forces is between the navies.  This reflects their shared interests in maritime 
security in the Indian Ocean, as well as the physical fact that navies 
commonly operate far from their home territories, frequently in contact with 
other navies.  The Indian Navy has been the most active of any of the Indian 
armed services in pursuing defence diplomacy throughout the Indo-Pacific 
region.  It currently conducts regular exercises with the navies of the United 
States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, Singapore, South Africa, and 
Brazil, but not with the Royal Australian Navy.   
In many ways, military exercises are the „pointy end‟ of defence cooperation.  
They provide an important forum for militaries to interact, learn from each 
other, and develop inter-operability, but they are also an important symbol of 
a broader strategic relationship.   
Currently, the RAN and the Indian Navy conduct irregular passing exercises 
(or „PASSEXes‟), mostly while Australian ships are on passage to and from 
deployment to the Persian Gulf.  Repeated requests by Australia for regular 
bilateral exercises have met with bureaucratic resistance in New Delhi, but 
during the June 2013 visit of Indian Defence Minister A. K. Antony to 
Australia, bilateral maritime exercises beginning in 2015 were announced.   
The ability of the Indian Navy to engage in regular exercises with other 
navies is constrained by the Indian MoD, which has an unofficial policy 
against the Indian Navy‟s participation in multilateral exercises.  This policy 
arose following Exercise Malabar 07, when the annual India-US naval 
exercises were expanded to include vessels from Australia, Japan, and 
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Singapore.  The exercise caused significant political backlash from Indian 
nationalists and leftists, who claimed that it signified a military alliance with 
the United States and/or a containment policy against China.  The avoidance 
of multilateral exercises means that the Indian Navy is stretched by the 
number of bilateral exercises it undertakes.  
PASSEXes: Australia can certainly give more attention to the opportunities 
for PASSEXes, which have less impact on the Indian Navy‟s resources.  
PASSEXes—perhaps even including multiple vessels—represent a 
politically non-controversial way of increasing the frequency of interactions 
between Australian and Indian vessels.  One senior serving Indian flag 
officer remarked that the RAN may not be taking full advantage of 
opportunities for more substantial PASSEXes while on passage to and from 
the Persian Gulf area.  There was a perception that the RAN may be more 
interested in R&R or in getting home, than in exercising with the Indian Navy.  
However, it is more likely that the RAN vessels were time-constrained by 
their scheduled dates of return to Australia which are very difficult to change.  
Pushing for extended PASSEXes will therefore require a political decision in 
Canberra to reduce deployment time in the Persian Gulf area and spend 
more time in transit, including in visits to India.   
Regular bilateral naval exercises: In June 2013, the Indian Defence 
Minister agreed to commence regular bilateral naval exercises by 2015.  
Holding such exercises alternatively in the Bay of Bengal and off Fremantle 
would facilitate the inclusion of an Anti-Submarine Warfare element in the 
exercises, which may be attractive to the Indian Navy.  A possible alternative 
could be to hold exercises out of India‟s Andaman Islands, which may permit 
the Indian Navy to commit greater resources while also fitting with the RAN‟s 
regular visits to Singapore and Malaysia.  It would also underline India‟s and 
Australia‟s common interests in ensuring freedom of navigation through the 
Strait of Malacca.   
Multilateral naval exercises: Although the Indian Navy would, in principle, 
also welcome the opportunity for multilateral exercises involving the RAN, it 
may find it difficult to participate in the Australian-hosted Exercise Kakadu.  A 
senior serving Indian flag officer commented that the Indian Navy had 
previously received in principle approval from the MoD to participate in 
Kakadu and had made preparations to do so, but at the last moment was 
blocked by the MoD apparently on the grounds of cost.  This may change in 
coming years.  In the longer term there may also be potential for trilateral 
naval exercises involving India, Australia, and other key Indian Ocean 
partners such as Indonesia, Singapore or South Africa, focusing on 
Humanitarian and Disaster Relief (HADR) and/or Search and Rescue (SAR).  
New Delhi may see the involvement of other non-western states in addition 
to Australia as easing potential political concerns. 
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Amphibious capabilities: Amphibious capabilities are currently a major 
focus for both India and Australia and could potentially provide an important 
area of specialisation in the India-Australia defence relationship.  In the 
longer term, amphibious exercises focused on HADR and Non-combatant 
Evacuation Operations (NEOs) could become a focus in the naval 
relationship, as well as potentially creating opportunities for enhanced 
interaction between the respective armies and air forces.   
Submarine escape training: Submarine escape training presents another 
opportunity.  The RAN‟s Submarine Escape Training facility in Fremantle is 
one of only a handful of such facilities in the world.  Australia has recently 
agreed to give the Indonesian Navy access to the facility and the RAN could 
also offer use of the facility to the Indian Navy.  This would be an opportunity 
to develop closer ties between the Indian and Australian submarine forces, 
which are the largest and most advanced among Indian Ocean states.  
HUMANITARIAN AND DISASTER RELIEF/SEARCH AND RESCUE 
HADR and SAR operations are likely to play an ever more important part in 
naval operations, both as a response to domestic political expectations and 
as a function of soft power.  As discussed below, many saw the Indian 
Navy‟s HADR response to the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami as a game-
changer in its thinking about the importance of amphibious capabilities as 
has India‟s more recent NEO operations in Lebanon and Libya.   
HADR and SAR are commonly-cited areas for cooperation between navies 
and related services without the political controversy in India that often 
accompanies defence cooperation with western states.  While HADR and 
SAR sit at the „soft‟ end of the spectrum of security cooperation, they can be 
useful fields in which to develop personal relationships and inter-operability 
as well as providing an opportunity to generate significant goodwill.   
India‟s work with Australia, the United States and Japan in the multilateral 
naval response effort to the 2004 Tsunami is often seen as a major turning 
point in Indian understanding of the potential benefits of cooperation with 
other maritime democracies in the Indo-Pacific.  Cooperation between the 
four navies led directly to the 2007 proposals for a Quadrilateral Security 
Dialogue, discussed above.  The episode was an important lesson in the 
potentially broader strategic consequences of cooperation in HADR. 
There is potential for Australia, India and other Indian Ocean partners to 
work together in a number of ways.  Australia and Indonesia have 
established a joint Facility for Disaster Reduction (AIFDR) and there is 
potential for India to be included in similar arrangements.  India and Australia 
could also sponsor the development of a system for responding to natural 
disasters in the Indian Ocean region similar to the FRANZ trilateral 
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cooperation arrangement in the South Pacific.
12
  Under the FRANZ 
arrangement, Australia, France, and New Zealand exchange information to 
ensure the best use of their assets and other resources for relief operations 
after cyclones and other natural disasters.  The arrangement also provides 
for disaster relief coordination engaging aid and defence elements from all 
three countries.  Overall, cooperation between India and Australia in disaster 
relief could yield considerable benefits for relatively little cost. 
MARITIME PIRACY 
In coming years, India and Australia will be expected to shoulder an 
increasing burden of responsibilities for Indian Ocean maritime security in 
relation to non-state actors.  This includes responding to piracy, maritime 
terrorism, smuggling, people trafficking, and illegal fishing.   
Piracy in and around the Strait of Malacca was previously a matter of 
concern but this is now much reduced.  Concerns about piracy have largely 
shifted to the western Indian Ocean.  Australia contributes to international 
efforts to fight piracy and maritime terrorism in the northwest Indian Ocean 
through participation in the Combined Military Forces in Combined Task 
Forces 150 and 151 and India undertakes anti-piracy operations in the 
region by itself.  While there may be potential for the RAN and Indian Navy 
to coordinate their efforts in the northeast Indian Ocean, the Indian Navy 
appears to be content with its current efforts and sees no pressing need to 
change them.  In any event, incidents of piracy in the northwest Indian 
Ocean have dropped considerably in recent times and feelings of „crisis‟ 
have receded.  
A more ambitious initiative could involve the promotion of a Memorandum of 
Understanding on Piracy among Indian Ocean littoral states and other 
interested states to set out agreed zones of responsibility in relation to 
piracy.  This might make anti-piracy efforts more efficient, but would probably 
require a significant political commitment from New Delhi. 
MARITIME BORDER PROTECTION AND MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS 
The protection of India‟s maritime borders from terrorists and other illegal 
arrivals has become a major Indian security concern in recent years, 
particularly since the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai when Pakistani-based 
terrorists infiltrated the city from the sea.  Maritime border protection has also 
become a major security focus for Australia.   
The distances across the Indian Ocean makes tracking of vessels and 
aircraft (both military and civil) in this space a very difficult task and currently 
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beyond the resources of any single country.  This makes maritime domain 
awareness a ripe area for cooperation and an opportunity to build ongoing 
relationships between the services.  India has made major investments in its 
maritime intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, in 
recent years.  Australia already has considerable maritime ISR capabilities 
throughout the eastern Indian Ocean in areas that abut or overlap with areas 
of strategic interest to India, including operating AP-3C Orion aircraft through 
Malaysia‟s Butterworth Air Base.  In coming years, both India and Australia 
will acquire Boeing P-8 maritime aircraft as the backbone of their maritime 
ISR capabilities; both are also considering acquiring Global Hawke UAVs or 
their maritime equivalents.  These common platforms and sensors may 
create opportunities for cooperation in training and maintenance.   
The Indian Navy has expressed interest in working with Australia in shipping 
identification including the Australian Maritime Identification System.  While 
both India and Australia already have access to shared information about so-
called „white‟ shipping (merchant vessels), it would be a significant step to 
extend information-sharing arrangements to so-called „grey‟ or „red‟ shipping.  
There are also opportunities for cooperation between India, Australia and 
key security partners in Southeast Asia (such as Indonesia, Singapore, and 
Malaysia) in enhancing maritime domain awareness in the eastern Indian 
Ocean, the Indonesian archipelago, and the South China Sea.  It has, for 
example, been suggested that India and Australia could jointly sponsor a 
regional maritime domain partnership, which would involve collaboration with 
Southeast Asian states in intelligence sharing, maritime domain awareness 
and coordinated patrolling.
13
  
COOPERATION BETWEEN OTHER MILITARY SERVICES 
The potential for cooperation between the Indian and Australian air forces 
and armies are somewhat more limited than in the maritime space, although 
opportunities do exist. 
For much of their history, the Indian Air Force (IAF) and RAAF used quite 
different equipment which, apart from political factors, has reduced the 
scope for cooperation.  However, many common platforms are now being 
operated or are in the process of being acquired by the IAF and RAAF.  This 
currently includes Hawk trainers (which are manufactured under licence in 
India), C-17 Globemaster and C-130 Hercules transport aircraft, and will 
soon also include P-8 Poseidon aircraft, A330 multi role tanker transports, 
and CH-47F Chinook heavy lift helicopters.  These common platforms 
provide opportunities for shared training, maintenance, and in the longer 
term, even exercises.  According to one Australian observer, Australia‟s and 
India‟s interests in operating common air force platforms might place the 
relationship on a different footing compared with some other defence 
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partners of India, who are sometimes seen as using cooperation as a way of 
showcasing potential equipment sales to India.  Australia has no vested 
interests in this respect. 
For its part, the RAAF sees considerable benefits from greater interaction 
with the IAF, including gaining the benefit of the IAF‟s perspectives on 
doctrine, war fighting and the operation of common platforms.  This would 
provide the RAAF with access to different ways of thinking as compared with 
the United States.  The RAAF may also be interested in the IAF‟s particular 
experience in areas such as high altitude flying (which the IAF frequently 
practises in the Himalayas) and flight safety.  The RAAF has suggested 
implementing greater cooperation with the IAF through the establishment of 
„sister‟ relationships between squadrons that operate common platforms.  
This could provide a structure for reciprocal visits and personal relationships.   
There is potential for bilateral air exercises in the longer term.  The IAF has 
previously provided observers to Exercise Pitch Black, which is Australia‟s 
leading multilateral air force exercise, involving participants such as the 
United States, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia.  In the future, there may 
be scope to expand the IAF‟s role to participate in the International Planning 
Group element in Exercise Pitch Black.  Although bilateral exercises are not 
currently being considered, there may be long-term potential for bilateral 
exercises in the relatively non-controversial areas of HADR/SAR, with a 
focus on the shared maritime domain.  In addition, given that India‟s 
maritime surveillance capabilities are largely operated through the Indian 
Naval Air Arm, it may make sense for the RAAF to give greater focus to 
developing a direct relationship with the Indian Navy. 
Opportunities for cooperation between the Indian and Australian armies may 
be more limited.  The two armies are quite different in some ways.  The 
Australian Army is relatively small and largely structured as an expeditionary 
force, while the Indian Army is a large standing force focused on border 
defence and internal security.  These differences in structure and missions 
may limit opportunities for exercises.  Nevertheless, there may be 
opportunities for specialised cooperation, for example, in training for high 
altitude or amphibious operations. 
Their shared histories of service can also be celebrated.  Australian and 
Indian soldiers have fought alongside each other in numerous conflicts, 
including at Gallipoli (1915), in Palestine (1917-18), France (1914-18), North 
Africa (1940-42), Syria (1941), Malaya/Singapore (1941-42), and elsewhere 
in Southeast Asia (1941-45).  These battle honours are an important 
reminder of the shared histories and traditions of the Indian and Australian 
armed forces, which can be a foundation for further cooperation.   
A potential focus for army-army cooperation can be the sharing of India‟s 
and Australia‟s knowledge and experience in peacekeeping operations.  
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Both countries have long been contributors to such operations.  India has 
contributed to some forty United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations with 
more than 100,000 personnel, making it one of the largest contributors of 
any country in the world.  Australia has contributed to more than 100 peace 
operations involving some 30,000 personnel.  Enhanced cooperation in the 
training of peacekeepers can be an important opportunity to demonstrate 
India‟s and Australia‟s shared commitment to the UN and international 
stability.  It can also be an important opportunity for Australia to learn from 
India‟s expertise in this area, while India might benefit from Australia‟s recent 
experience in stabilisation operations among Pacific island states. 
India operates the Centre for United Nations Peacekeeping in New Delhi, 
which also provides the Secretariat of the International Association of 
Peacekeeping Training Centres.  Australia‟s Peacekeeping Operations 
Training Centre is located in Newcastle.  In the past Australia and India have 
exchanged students and instructors to their peacekeeping training centres 
on an ad hoc basis.  More focused cooperation in peacekeeping training 
may be possible and in the longer term the potential for bilateral 
peacekeeping exercises can be explored.  India currently conducts 
peacekeeping exercises with several regional states, while Australia 
conducts a biennial peacekeeping exercise with Thailand.   
DEFENCE TECHNOLOGY COOPERATION 
Some see defence technology as a potentially important focus in the 
relationship.  India‟s need for defence technology has formed a key part of 
its relationships with the Soviet Union/Russia, France, Israel, and the United 
States, and increasingly also regional partners.  In 2013, New Delhi 
announced that it was acquiring at least fifteen US-2 amphibious aircraft 
from Japan as part of an enhanced strategic partnership with Tokyo.  The 
possibility of getting access to defence technology is something that gets 
New Delhi‟s attention.   
But there are also reasons for caution in using defence exports by Australian 
companies as a means to enhance the bilateral relationship.  The most 
significant is the parlous state of India‟s defence procurement system, which 
is Byzantine, dysfunctional, riddled with corruption, and as a consequence 
barely functioning.  With few exceptions, defence acquisitions involving 
foreign private suppliers are at a virtual standstill, although major sales made 
on a government-to-government basis are moving ahead, if slowly.  
Australian defence suppliers are likely to be extremely hesitant about the 
risks of trying to do business in the Indian defence sector unless significant 
changes are made in the Indian defence procurement system.  That seems 
many years away. 
But Australian companies may have opportunities that do not necessarily 
involve exposure to the Indian defence procurement process.  In naval 
shipbuilding, this could include programmes for the joint training of naval 
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engineers or, for example, exploiting the interests of third parties in the 
Indian and Australian defence industries.  Private shipbuilders such as 
Pipavav Defence are becoming increasingly prominent in India and they 
could be potential partners with Australian companies.  The huge 
paramilitary forces maintained by the Indian central and state governments 
are also major buyers, although this market tends to be keenly priced and 
unsuitable for high-end high-priced products. 
Direct cooperation between the government defence research organisations, 
India‟s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and 
Australia‟s Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) is 
another opportunity.  In theory at least there is considerable scope for 
cooperation and joint projects between the DRDO and DSTO in shared 
areas of interest.  In recent years, India‟s DRDO has entered into 
technology-sharing agreements with its counterparts in countries such as 
South Korea and Singapore.  
But Australia‟s DSTO may not currently consider India as a priority 
international partner and its current arrangements with key technology 
partners may constrain its ability to exchange information with the DRDO.  
The DRDO‟s role as both an R&D organisation and a manufacturer is also 
seen as a cause of potential complications.  The caution of the DSTO in 
engaging with the DRDO may only change as part of a broader government 
approach of enhanced cooperation with India. 
But some observers question the utility of trying to use defence technology 
cooperation—particularly technology procurement—as a means of 
developing a closer security relationship.  India has, in the past, resisted 
attempts of several of its defence technology partners (such as the former 
Soviet Union and currently the United States) to leverage defence sales into 
a broader defence relationship.  A Pentagon study found that senior Indian 
military officers tend to see defence technology procurement as quite 
separate from a broader defence relationship and are resistant to allowing 
equipment acquisitions to be used as a reason for operational cooperation.
14
  
Experience has also demonstrated that a defence procurement relationship 
with India, even by major powers, can often be a cause of considerable 
disputes and political irritations in the bilateral relationship.   
For these reasons, although there may be opportunities for defence 
technology cooperation in certain niche areas, both Canberra and New Delhi 
may be cautious about trying to focus on this area as a major aspect in 
developing the relationship. 
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COOPERATION IN ANTARCTIC RESEARCH 
A further area of potential cooperation is in Antarctic research.  While not 
directly security related, this area relates to the shared oceanic domain and 
can potentially create goodwill and a feeling of oceanic partnership.  
Australia‟s efforts in the Antarctic are conducted through the Australian 
Antarctic Division (AAD) based in Tasmania, while India‟s are conducted 
though the National Centre for Antarctic and Oceanic Research (NCAOR), 
based in Goa, which reports to the Ministry of Earth Sciences.  Both 
organisations are wholly devoted to scientific research.   
Australia has had a permanent presence in the Antarctic since 1954 and 
now operates four permanent bases.  Australia claims more than 40 per cent 
of the continent as Australian territory.  Although India has had a permanent 
presence since 1984, there has been relatively little interaction between the 
two countries.  India‟s Maitri Station is on the other side of the continent from 
the Australian bases.  However, the opening in 2013 of a new Indian base, 
called Bharati Station, which is some 120 km from Australia‟s Davis base, 
opens considerable opportunities for cooperation in logistics and scientific 
research. 
Currently, all of India‟s air logistics to the Antarctic are channelled through 
South Africa using the Russian-sponsored DROMLAN consortium.  This 
makes sense for the supply of India‟s Maitri Station (which is located south 
of Cape Town), but less so for Bharati Station.  Supplies for Bharati are now 
taken to Maitri Station and then airlifted a further 4,000 km across the middle 
of Antarctica, including a refuelling stop at a Japanese base.  
Bharati could potentially use the Australian logistical supply system 
operating through Tasmania, which is used to supply Davis Station.  
Similarly, it may make sense to share maritime supply arrangements.  
Currently, a vessel chartered by the NCAOR must make a fifty-day triangular 
run between Cape Town, Maitri Station and Bharati Station, severely 
restricting its abilities to make deliveries to Bharati.  The potential for 
exchange of scientific personnel between the AAD and NCAOR is also 
unrealised.  
3.  Prospects for a Security and Defence Partnership 
Where does that leave the prospects for security and defence cooperation 
between India and Australia?  Although there are numerous shared interests 
and opportunities for cooperation, a closer relationship will require sustained 
political will in both Canberra and New Delhi to overcome the differences in 
strategic culture and perspective.   
Australia recognises India as an important new security partner in the Indo-
Pacific, but India is only beginning to see Australia as a useful partner.  For 
India, in some ways, Australia represents a difficult case.  India has no direct 
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security interests in our immediate area and Australia‟s close relationship 
with the United States sometimes creates political unease in New Delhi.  
For several reasons, moves towards greater security and defence 
cooperation will need to be initiated by Australia, which has significantly 
more focus, resources, and experience in defence cooperation than India.  
But if Australia wishes to be successful in its objectives of promoting greater 
cooperation with India, it will have to consider the following: 
 Australia must convince India that it can better achieve its strategic 
objectives in the Indo-Pacific in cooperation with Australia than by 
acting alone. 
 Australia will have to demonstrate that there are practical security 
problems that must be addressed in a cooperative manner.   
 While mutual concerns about China are an important underlying 
element, China should not be elevated as the moving cause of the 
relationship.   
 Australia will have to move in a consistent and sustained manner 
with a time horizon considerably longer than it is generally used to.  
 Australia must also move past any immediate expectations of the 
reciprocity that would be expected in developing security 
partnerships with most countries.  India simply does not have the 
institutional capability to act in a reciprocal manner, as do other 
countries. 
In short, if Australia wishes to enhance its security and defence relationship 
with India, it must be prepared to act outside its comfort zone.  Australia has 
considerable experience in defence cooperation with the United States and 
its allies and partners in the Asia Pacific.  This has often focused on 
providing assistance, but the emphasis is now moving towards strategic 
partnerships.  As a recent report on Australia‟s defence diplomacy 
programme commented:  
As regional defence forces expand and modernise and we lose our 
technological advantage, engagement becomes more about strategic 
partnerships and less about aid and assistance.  This requires a significant 
change in mindset.
15
  
In many ways, India represents a sui generis case in Australia‟s regional 
relationships, certainly in the degree of caution it exhibits in relation to 
security and defence cooperation with other countries.  This represents a 
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considerable challenge for Australia in developing an effective model for 
engagement with India. 
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